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A tipping point happens when a critical mass 
of people begin to shift their perception of 
an issue and take action in a new direction. 
As I look across the global landscape, I feel 
that we are approaching a tipping point 
concerning global sustainability. It is catalyzed 
by at least three important realizations by 
business, government, and civil society:
The fi rst is a realization that the world is 
fi nite and that a growing population with 
a higher ambition for living standards will 
inevitably lead to a world which will be 
resource and carbon constrained. 
The second is the realization that to solve 
the challenges for this future world we need 
systems solutions. We cannot solve individual 
problems in silos. The connections between 
energy, climate change, water, food, urban 
infrastructure and the imperative of 
functioning ecosystems are very clear. 
A third realization is that no part of society 
can solve this on its own. Individually, 
governments, businesses, and civil society 
lack the technology, fi nancial resources, and 
management skills to build a sustainable world 
on their own. Yet collectively, we already 
have – or can develop – everything that is 
needed for this large-scale transformation. 
As a result, there is growing interest in new 
types of public-private partnerships that 
jointly fi nd solutions to these issues. In such 
partnerships, the skills and resources of both 
the private sector and civil society are 
combined with the legislative and regulatory 
power of governments. 
Foreword
One of the arenas that is rapidly moving 
toward a sustainability tipping point and which 
o ers exemplars of creative partnerships is 
that of commodity market transformation. 
This is the collective e ort by businesses, 
NGOs, labour unions, and governments to 
restructure the production and distribution 
systems of commodities to be more 
sustainable, while building broad market 
demand for sustainable products. If done 
well, these improved markets will deliver 
large-scale social and environmental outcomes 
that advance the millennium development 
goals and strengthen the economic viability 
of entire commodity sectors and the leading 
companies involved. 
A recognised catalyst of this kind of market 
transformation is the Dutch Sustainable 
Trade Initiative (IDH). IDH’s mission is to 
upscale and accelerate the mainstreaming 
of sustainability in global commodity chains. 
Through innovative public-private partnerships, 
IDH joins the forces of multiple stakeholders 
to build and execute programs that tackle 
social, ecological, and economic bottlenecks to 
commodity market sustainability. In addition 
IDH acts as a knowledge broker, capturing 
and sharing best practices in supply chain 
sustainability. 
This booklet is part of a series of IDH-
supported case studies that focus on the 
“know-how” of commodity market transfor-
m ation. These studies are fi lled with practical 
insights, wisdom, and time-tested advice from 
those deep in the trenches of driving real 
change in global markets. I encourage you 
to take these lessons learned and innovative 
ideas straight to the heart of your own work. 
By doing so, we will take another powerful 
step toward a tipping point for global 
sustainability. 
Björn Stigson
President, World Business Council 
for Sustainable Development
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Chapter 1
Executive summary
 ‘We convinced the 
farmers to adapt good 
agricultural practices 
through their own 
experiments on the 
fi eld. This soon led 
to increased yields 
and to extra income 
for them.’
Peter Mbadi, Agriculture Manager,
Kenya Tea Development Agency (KTDA)
These pressures threaten not only the raw 
material supply for key industries such as 
food & beverage and textiles, but also the 
livelihoods of tens of millions of people and 
the natural resources they depend on. For this 
reason, companies, NGOs, and governments 
are actively seeking solutions to render 
commodity value chains more sustainable. 
Tea – production, processing and consumption 
– is one of the commodity value chains in 
question. Part one of this case, the fi rst of 
IDH’s Market Transformation case series, 
documents the strategic evolution of a 
groundbreaking initiative by Unilever, the 
Anglo-Dutch food & beverage company, 
to make its own tea value chain sustainable. 
This initiative started with the popular Lipton 
and PG Tips brands in specifi c countries and 
is gradually rolling out in other regions of 
the world. 
Commodity value chains around the world are 
increasingly stressed; some even face severe and 
dire circumstances. This is due to myriad social, 
environmental and economic challenges linked 
to the fi nite nature of natural resources and rapidly 
growing populations. 
By reading part two of this case study, 
business executives and other stakeholders 
will learn from Unilever’s journey in multiple 
ways. The company, recognising that no 
single entity can solve the complex issues 
around conversion of the tea value chain 
on its own, entered into a partnership with 
the Rainforest Alliance. Through Rainforest 
Alliance certifi cation of tea plantations, the 
partnership has accelerated a transformation 
to sustainable Unilever tea products. Part two 
of the case study focuses on the very di erent 
experiences of Unilever “on the ground” in 
Kenya and Argentina. The lessons learned 
from building the partnerships in each country 
and the “win-win” outcomes for the players 
involved are carefully extracted and reported 
in each case.
The Kenyan and Argentinian case stories are 
excellent examples of how companies, by 
carefully building multidimensional business 
cases for sustainability and strategic execution 
plans that account for the specifi c challenges 
of sustainability and partnerships, can grasp 
opportunities and forge new markets. It shows 
how companies can become fi rst movers and 
leaders in contributing to more sustainable 
business models, stimulating multiple local 
environmental, social and economic pay o s 
while simultaneously ensuring the fi nancial 
and longer-term sustainability of their 
core business. 
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Most interestingly in this case, the moves 
made by Unilever have had a knock-on e ect 
of contributing to a “tipping point” for 
sustainability in the tea sector. As a direct 
result of Unilever’s initiatives, several other 
major companies and brands followed in 
Unilever’s footsteps and are certifying their 
own tea supply chains. This has happened 
without the loss of business benefi ts to 
Unilever, implying that the business rationale 
was founded on more than a “fi rst mover” 
competitive advantage. The case stories 
of Unilever’s engagement in Kenya and 
Argentina document, on a local level, key 
parts of a tangible framework for this “systems 
solution” to the complex sustainability 
dilemmas around tea production. Although 
excellent and leading examples of certifi cation 
initiatives have existed for some time, this 
may be the fi rst time that such a partnership 
will succeed in impacting an entire commodity 
value chain far beyond the activities of the 
actual company involved. 
To accelerate momentum towards the 
requisite “sustainability tipping points” 
across commodity value chains, it is vital 
that such cases enter mainstream business 
thinking, refl ection and learning. To attain 
this objective, parts one and two of this case, 
and forthcoming “market transformation” 
best practice examples, will be converted to 
a series of teachable cases used in the core 
curriculum of IMD business school, other 
academic institutions and in company 
training programs. This case is already an 
integral part of a Masterclass Workshop for 
mainstream managers in companies linked 
to commodity value chains. This is conducted 
by IMD’ s Center for Corporate Sustainability 
Management annually in Switzerland and 
the United States in partnership with the 
Sustainable Agriculture Initiative Platform 
(SAI Platform) and the Dutch Sustainable 
Trade Initiative.
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To ensure an accelerated supply-chain roll-
out of certifi ed tea during Phase 1, Unilever 
and the Rainforest Alliance established a 
priority list of large estates in a few selected 
countries, while working concurrently to 
expand certifi cation to smallholders.
Working with large estates was e  cient not 
only because of obvious scale advantages – 
which allowed the rapid conversion of large 
areas and large volumes of tea within a short 
time span – but also because it was e  cient 
and cost e ective. Marc Monsarrat, Rainforest 
Alliance manager for East Africa and South 
Asia, recalled: 
‘Large tea estates are professionally 
managed and have competent technical sta . 
After a single training session, the sta  could 
start implementing changes required for 
certifi cation. They quickly learned how to 
use available tools to improve management 
systems. They were able to train growers 
to work more e  ciently in the plantations. 
In fact, it was about fi ne tuning existing 
practices rather than carrying out major 
overhauls. In a few months, we could 
stir su  cient changes to bring them to 
compliance level with standards2 required 
for certifi cation.’
In May 2007 Unilever publicly announced its goal 
to source the tea in all Lipton teabags sold globally 
from Rainforest Alliance Certifi edTM farms by 2015. 
The supply-chain and marketing roll-out was planned 
to be unfolded in two phases; Phase 1 being complete 
when all of the tea in Lipton Yellow Label tea bags sold 
in Western Europe became Rainforest Alliance Certifi ed.1
Reaching out to smallholders during Phase 2, 
although signifi cantly more challenging, was 
not negotiable. Jagjeet Kandal, global tea 
sustainability manager at Unilever, explained:
‘We source tea from many thousands of 
smallholder farmers worldwide. To ensure 
a long-term supply of certifi ed tea, 
smallholders must be on board. Having 
worked with them for decades we know 
their challenges. We set up partnerships with 
local and national governments, academia 
and NGOs to help tea smallholders to 
implement sustainable practices. We know 
from experience that even relatively small 
improvements in smallholder agricultural 
practices can go a long way on yield 
increase, long-term income security for 
families, local biodiversity and farmed 
landscape conservation.’
Chapter 2
Introduction
 ‘Our experience 
shows that even small 
improvements in 
smallholder agricultural 
practices can increase 
yields, long-term income 
security for families, 
local biodiversity 
and farmed landscape 
conservation.’
Jagjeet Kandal,
Unilever
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Yet expanding certifi cation to a large 
and fragmented base of tea smallholders 
required intensive work on capacity-building 
and technical assistance, as well as a more 
complex auditing structure. Growing 
capability to match the speed required by 
the markets and gaining access to countries 
where the Rainforest Alliance and the 
Sustainable Agriculture Network (SAN) had 
little previous experience was a signifi cant 
challenge. The Rainforest Alliance had to 
identify suitable local partners as trainers 
and technical advisors, and then use scarce 
human and fi nancial resources to train them. 
A second network of technical assistants 
responsible for keeping track of the progress 
of farmers on the ground had to be created 
and qualifi ed through local partners. 
In addition, the Rainforest Alliance/SAN 
had to concurrently put in place a structure 
for the certifi cation (auditing) function, 
identifying and training local/regional teams 
of auditors to assess compliance with 
standards. The cost-e ectiveness of the 
link between the two functions – training 
and auditing – was not a given. The institution 
could train farmers on how to bring their 
practices to certifi cation level, but it could 
not be sure they could reach compliance 
with the SAN standard and pass the 
certifi cation audit.
This document predominately describes 
Unilever’s e ort to reach out to smallholders 
in Kenya and Argentina. It contrasts both 
enablers and challenges in Kenya and 
Argentina due to the respective societal 
and business context as well as to the specifi c 
roles taken by key value chain players and 
other stakeholders in these two countries.
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In 2006 Unilever had partnered with the 
Kenya Tea Development Agency (KTDA) 
in an extension program to promote good 
agricultural practices as a tool to foster 
sustainable tea production. This program 
was based on a series of guidelines developed 
by the Tea Research Foundation of Kenya and 
Unilever’s own sustainable agriculture code.
Laying the Groundwork with the 
Farmer Field Schools
In March 2006, KTDA and Unilever (through 
its Lipton brand) began work on the ground 
with smallholders. It was supported by 
funding from Unilever, the UK’s Department 
for International Development – DFID (from 
2006 to 2009) and The Dutch Sustainable 
Trade Initiative – IDH (from 2009 to 2011). 
Expertise came from Wageningen UR, ETC 
East Africa and the Tea Research Foundation 
of Kenya. Pilot projects were initiated, using 
the Farmer Field School (FFS)4 approach, to 
provide tea smallholders with the motivation, 
skills and technical assistance for improvement 
of production and implementation of more 
sustainable farm management practices.
Unilever’s work on good agricultural practices with 
smallholders in Kenya had already started before 
the company’s commitment to source its tea from 
Rainforest Alliance Certifi ed farms. 
3.1
Chapter 3
Combining E orts in Kenya
 ‘Distributing 
certifi cation and the 
resultant benefi ts 
across di erent tea 
producing regions 
was a key factor 
in securing e ective 
roll out.’
Dave Boselie,
Wageningen UR
Box 1. Smallholders in Tea  Production 
in Kenya
In Kenya, the world’s biggest tea 
exporter, smallholders accounted for 
over 60% of tea production in 2009. 
The tea sector supports, in a direct 
and indirect way, approximately 10% 
of Kenya’s population.
Farms are typically less than half an 
acre, but some can be up to 3.5 acres. 
Farmers usually grow tea in parallel 
with other crops such as maize, 
vegetables and beans, in addition to 
livestock. However, family livelihoods 
heavily rely on tea. Although tea 
prices have been kept at a low level 
for the past three decades,3 the risk 
of complete crop failure is low 
and tea remains a crucial cash crop 
for smallholders. 
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Box 2. Unilever partners in the 
FFS initiative
KTDA is the second largest exporter of 
black tea in the world and is responsible 
for 62% of all tea produced in Kenya. 
The company provides management 
services for the production, processing 
and marketing of black tea to over half 
a million smallholders through 59 farmer-
owned tea factories. A typical factory 
processes the tea grown by a group 
of between 5,000 and 20,000 growers. 
It o ers farmers services such as technical 
assistance, provision of farming inputs 
and assistance with fi nancing, logistics 
and marketing.
The Department for International 
Development (DFID) is the part of the 
UK government that manages Britain’s aid 
to poor countries and works to eradicate 
extreme poverty.
The Dutch Sustainable Trade Initiative 
(IDH) is a multi-stakeholder platform 
supporting the acceleration and upscaling 
of sustainability within mainstream 
commodity markets. It forges enterprising 
alliances between governments, companies, 
trade unions and social organizations 
and is funded by the Ministry of Foreign 
A airs of the Dutch Government.
Wageningen UR (University and Research 
Centre) is an international university and 
research centre working in the area of 
“Healthy food and living environment.”
ETC East Africa is a not-for-profi t 
consultancy organization working with 
the public sector and civil society on issues 
such as agriculture and natural resource 
management, health, decentralization, 
local governance, service delivery and 
aid-management.
The Tea Research Foundation of Kenya 
(TRFK) promotes research on issues related 
to tea growing – and to other crops and 
systems of husbandry associated with tea 
throughout Kenya – such as productivity, 
quality, suitability of land, environmental 
conservation and appropriate technologies 
for tea processing and value adding in tea.
Unlike more traditional directive and top-
down approaches of technical assistance 
that provide farmers with instructions on 
what to do, when and how, the FFS approach 
is experiential and bottom-up. Groups of 
farmers gather together regularly, assisted 
by competent facilitators, to fi nd solutions 
to  improve their practices and to share 
learning from the trials they carry out in 
the fi eld. Dave Boselie, senior researcher 
sustainable supply chain development 
at LEI Wageningen UR, explained:
‘The FFS approach perceives farmers as 
local technical experts and enables them to 
understand their situation and learn how it 
can be improved. The trainers assist farmers 
to use indigenous knowledge appropriately 
so they are more motivated to improve 
performance.’
The fi rst pilots took place in 2006 and 
involved 120 farmers at four KTDA buying 
centers.6 Wageningen UR and ETC East 
Africa trained KTDA’s technical extension 
o  cers and assistants to take the role of 
facilitators. Farmers were able to prioritize 
content and decide on how it should be 
delivered. Within a year they explored a 
range of issues such as plucking intervals, 
tipping-in height of bushes after pruning,7 
agro-ecology, safe use of agro-chemicals, 
bookkeeping, using trials on the ground, 
fi eld visits, short talks, debate, storytelling 
and other activities. 
At fi rst, farmers were reluctant to take part, 
partly because they were averse to change 
and partly because they perceived the 
proposed changes as extra work and were 
uncertain about the benefi ts. However, the 
FFS method was tailored to this challenge. 
The farmer-centered approach allowed the 
groups to focus on what growers wanted 
to learn – instead of the traditional approach 
of focusing on what extension trainers wanted 
to teach. The atmosphere at the meetings 
was joyful; participants sang, danced, joked 
and prayed together. These aspects were 
collectively e ective in driving farmers’ 
motivation and softening change-averse 
mindsets. Most importantly, the experiential 
approach allowed farmers to witness real 
results of proposed crop management 
practices, making benefi ts tangible while 
reducing misperceptions of the amount of 
extra work. Peter Mbadi, agriculture manager 
at KTDA, explained:
‘Getting farmers to volunteer to participate 
in the Farmer Field School was not 
straightforward. They were apprehensive 
because it sounded like a lot of work and the 
benefi ts were not easy to grasp. We started 
with the less resistant ones, working on 
small changes that lead to quick results in 
terms of increased yields and quality, and 
therefore to extra income for the farmer. 
The best way to convince them to adapt 
good agricultural practices was through 
their own experiments on the fi eld.’
Or, as explained by Monsarrat on the 
Rainforest Alliance Frog Blog:
‘Farmer Field Schools are a kind of 
classroom without walls, where farmers 
come together every fortnight to learn and 
test new growing techniques on their own 
farms. It’s a participatory process guided 
by agronomists, where farmers experience 
the benefi ts of better crop husbandry 
for themselves and discuss social issues 
such as gender empowerment or 
HIV/AIDS prevention.’5
Or, as one farmer put it: 
‘At fi rst we found it hard to understand; 
challenging. For example, in the plucking 
trial, they used a long stick to fi nd the tea 
bush table height and we did not know why. 
Now that we do it, we can see the results.’8
The results, monitored in the fi eld by 
Wageningen UR,9 proved encouraging in 
terms of improved yields per hectare, better 
product quality, adoption of better agricultural 
practices, biodiversity conservation and 
reduced soil loss. The project evaluators 
also reported positive results on farmers’ 
empowerment, knowledge improvement 
and group cohesion.
Combining the Farmer Field Schools with 
Capacity Building for Certifi cation
In 2007, following its decision to convert 
to certifi ed sustainable tea, Unilever began 
to look for cost-e ective ways of getting 
Kenyan smallholders on board. Working 
with KTDA to make sustainable agriculture 
an integral part of the ongoing extension 
program was the natural way to go. 
Unilever bought approximately 40% of KTDA 
total production. Therefore, being able to 
supply the volumes of certifi ed tea required 
by Unilever on time was a market imperative 
for KTDA.
Since FFS had proved to be an e ective tool 
in fostering changes in the way smallholders 
managed their crops, Unilever and the 
Rainforest Alliance decided that it would 
also be a good tool to deploy the capacity-
building component to certifi cation. 
Combining the generic FFS training curriculum 
with more specifi c certifi cation criteria was 
seen by the two organizations and their 
partners as a cost-e  cient way to reach 
out to individual farmers. The training of 
FFS facilitators and the monitoring of results 
were the responsibilities of Wageningen UR 
and ETC East Africa. The Rainforest Alliance 
was responsible for training the trainers on 
the implementation of certifi cation practices 
and for managing the certifi cation/auditing 
process with its SAN partners.
3.2
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Certifying Kenyan Smallholders
By December 2009, some 12,000 smallholders 
had become Rainforest Alliance Certifi ed, 
having succeeded in making the social, 
economic and environmental changes 
necessary to achieve compliance. The farmers 
supplied the Momul Tea Factory Company, 
owned by KTDA. It was not only the fi rst 
group of smallholders in Kenya to meet 
Rainforest Alliance Certifi ed standards but 
also the largest single group to reach this 
status worldwide. 
Resources to fi nance the purchasing of 
personal protective equipment and other 
farm productive investments, such as farm 
equipment, dairy animals and poultry, came 
from a micro-fi nance institution created 
by KTDA in August 2009. Greenland Fedha 
Ltd was created as a subsidiary of KTDA 
as a non-deposit taking institution, in order 
to provide fi nancial services to low-income 
households in the tea sector12 and help curb 
the high cost of borrowing by o ering lower 
interest rates.
Monsarrat described how certifi cation led 
to multiple benefi ts:13
‘On average, farmers taking part in the FFSs 
saw their yields increase by 5%-15% in just 
two years – a huge success. The factory has 
distributed 140,000 tree seedlings to the 
farmers, thus ensuring that streams and 
rivers are protected. After removing thirsty 
eucalyptus trees (not native to Kenya) from 
the edges of streams, they found that many 
previously dry streams are beginning to 
fl ow again. Farmers are happy, as they are 
producing more and better tea after the 
training and are able to sell it at higher prices.’
As of February 2011, fi ve factories were 
certifi ed in Kenya and another nine were 
being audited.
The FFS curriculum was expanded to include 
other aspects of farming and to cover 
the social, environmental and economic 
requirements for certifi cation such as 
ecosystem conservation, wildlife protection, 
worker rights and safety, water and soil 
conservation, agrochemical reduction, 
decent housing and legal wages for workers. 
FFS meetings were also used as a vehicle 
to increase farmers’ awareness of the price 
premiums10 paid by Unilever for certifi ed tea. 
New groups were created in four factories 
and the FFS project was expanded to involve 
another 600 farmers. The following year, 
the partners decided to use the scaled-up 
project as a platform for certifi cation of 
the four factories serving 38,000 farmers. 
Transitioning from pilot projects to the roll-
out with almost 40,000 farmers was largely 
made possible due to the organization, 
experience and strong network of 
relationships of local partners, such as ETC 
East Africa. In addition, KTDA had qualifi ed 
people in their local extension teams who 
understood the requirements for international 
certifi cation and at the same time knew 
how to engage with local farmers.
However, scaling up to this many smallholders 
was not without challenges since balancing 
the expectations and priorities of partners 
with di erent organizational cultures required 
lengthy discussions and conscious fl exibility. 
Boselie explained:
‘We, the international partners, wanted to 
optimize logistics to take advantage of all 
available resources. So, it made sense for 
us to concentrate the upscaling phase in 
one region, thus reducing trainers’ travel 
and saving time and money. But for KTDA, 
the criteria for choosing regions and 
factories were broader than operational 
optimization. For them it was not about the 
cheapest solution but rather maintaining 
political goodwill and support for the 
program. KTDA understood that distributing 
the benefi ts and revenues of certifi cation 
across di erent tea producing regions was 
a key element to secure its e ective roll-out. 
We trusted their judgment and worked with 
factories in di erent regions.’
Roll-out Challenges
Transitioning from the upscaling phase to 
a full roll-out of the capacity-building aspect 
of certifi cation through the FFS was not 
without obstacles. 
In 2009, a short-term lack of external 
resources14 caused disturbances in the 
activities of external experts and put 
additional constraints on operations. 
Nevertheless, KTDA was able to carry out 
the roll-out of the FFS model. According 
to Boselie:
‘The intrinsic benefi ts of the Farmer Field 
Schools were strong enough to motivate 
KTDA to keep expanding its reach 
even under external funding constraints. 
It demonstrated the potential of the 
approach and the existence of a self-
propelling force in this type of technical 
assistance provision.’
Nonetheless, the self-propelling potential 
would not be strong enough to bring 
certifi cation capacity-building to the required 
scale if it counted solely on KTDA resources. 
Although very e ective, the FFS participatory 
approach had been relatively costly and time 
consuming. The availability of co-funding 
from international institutions such as IDH 
and the DFID was crucial to make the project 
feasible. It was therefore inevitable by late 
2010 that there would have to be a rethink 
about the capacity-building approach, 
as Monsarrat explained:
‘We have been very cost e ective on the 
training side, using an ongoing funded 
project as a springboard. Our focus has 
been to run the training in a way that can 
be continued in the years to come. However, 
we have not yet analyzed what that will 
require institutionally and how it can be 
done if and when the co-funding is no longer 
available. And we need to do so soon.’
In 2008, the fi rst groups concluded their FFS 
and certifi cation training and the initiative 
could count on communities of farmers 
capable of demonstrating practices, sharing 
new skills and showing the results in their 
own fi elds to other farmers.
In 2009, KTDA initiated the roll-out phase 
of the project, aiming at stretching the 
scope of the FFS to achieve:
I) the implementation of 6 FFS groups per 
factory, in all 59 factories; and
II) 21 Rainforest Alliance Certifi ed factories 
by 2011 (corresponding to approximately 
half of KTDA’s tea production area). 
A new funding scheme was put in place to 
support the accelerated expansion of the FFS 
reach. The activities for training the trainers 
– that is, KTDA’s training sta  at factory level 
and lead farmers at community/buying 
center level – received fi nancial support from 
IDH. Wageningen UR applied for a grant 
from the Agricultural Counselor of the Dutch 
Embassy in Nairobi. Unilever committed to 
cover the factories’ costs of certifi cation/
audit until they started receiving benefi ts 
from bringing certifi ed tea to the market.11
On the operational side, the organization 
introduced a third layer of extension agents: 
the lead farmers. Winnie Mwaniki, regional 
projects manager in East and South Africa for 
the Rainforest Alliance, explained their role:
‘Lead farmers set a good example for their 
neighbors, help with the training and internal 
inspections. They also work to improve 
their own environment; protecting the rivers, 
getting the water cleaner, planting trees 
to improve the local micro-climate.’
3.3 3.4
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On the one hand, a fast roll-out to 
smallholders in other countries could not 
rely solely on the strength of local farmers’ 
responsiveness to market incentives o ered 
by the global company. As demonstrated 
by the Kenyan case, it would depend to 
a great extent on the Rainforest Alliance’s 
capacity to fi nd local partners able to 
quickly and e ectively reach out to a large 
base of smallholders and engage them in 
the certifi cation process.
On the other hand, a partner similar to KTDA 
was not easy to fi nd, since the organization 
was able to quickly achieve scale and 
engage farmers in the certifi cation process 
due to a quite unique combination of factors, 
as described by Monsarrat: 
‘As the second largest black tea exporter 
in the world, it has a strong position in the 
tea value chain. Its organization around 
factories, each having several thousand 
farmers, already provided the needed scale 
for a quick roll-out. Being a farmer-owned 
organization was defi nitely a plus for 
engagement. Its well-organized production 
and marketing model is not easily found 
among smallholder organizations. In addition, 
because of its good relationships at 
governmental level in Kenya, KTDA was 
able to unlock political barriers. 
It is defi nitely more challenging in other 
countries where smallholders operate on a 
one-to-one basis (and not as a group) with 
factories. It is generally a big struggle around 
the world to organize a large number of 
small producers in a competitive manner. 
Even where smallholder associations do exist, 
they are not as strong and do not provide 
such comprehensive services as KTDA does.’
Furthermore, the organizations driving the 
process were already questioning whether 
the intensity and group-focus approach of 
the FFS was the only way forward. Boselie 
observed:
‘Would a much lighter version of instruction 
and training do the job? Although the 
participatory approach has proved e ective, 
we don’t know if a lighter version of the 
FFS approach would be su  cient to achieve 
our purpose just as well. This is a crucial 
question, but we are still in the early stages 
of learning by doing. We are thinking about 
alternatives, such as combining group focus 
on the actual training of farmers with the 
use of information technology for the 
monitoring of results and technical feedback.’
In addition, because participation in the FFS 
was voluntary, the factories and producers 
that had engaged so far were the ones that 
were less resistant to change, those who 
were most willing to experiment and innovate. 
Therefore, it might be the case not only that 
late followers and laggards could require a 
completely di erent approach than the one 
taken with the front runners, but also that 
the speed of conversion could signifi cantly 
slow down.
On another issue, Monsarrat voiced 
Rainforest Alliance’s concerns that the level 
of turnaround of extension sta  could put 
knowledge transfer and training e  ciency 
at risk: 
‘There is a danger that lessons learned will 
be lost since good extension o  cers and 
assistants are leaving the project in search 
of other career opportunities. The whole 
process could slow down if new extension 
agents “re-invent wheels” at a critical 
moment when the number of groups 
to be trained is growing at a fast pace.’
Boselie raised other crucial challenges 
to be faced in the years to come:
‘Today we are facing new questions. KTDA 
covers various end markets and has been 
involved in di erent certifi cation schemes, 
such as Fairtrade, Organic, UTZ certifi ed and 
the Rainforest Alliance Certifi ed, so as to be 
able to answer to customers’ demands of 
Working with a large base of farmers on 
an individual basis was a major challenge, 
as it would require quickly and e  ciently 
organizing them in functional groups. 
Emulating the creation of organizations 
similar to KTDA in other countries was an 
even bigger challenge under Unilever’s 
stretched deadlines to fully convert its tea 
supply-chain. It would not only require 
extensive time and resources, but also 
substantial structural changes on existing 
value chains. 
The roll-out of certifi cation in Argentina was 
a good example of the potential for reaching 
out to smallholders in countries in which 
mechanisms facilitating access to smallholders 
were absent. In Argentina, certifi cation roll-
out had to be built “from scratch” since there 
was little organization in the tea value chain, 
no track record of extension work with 
smallholders and signifi cant issues regarding 
quality and productivity.
specifi c certifi cation schemes. As a general 
principle, KTDA has divided the di erent 
certifi cation schemes across its factories.15 
Nonetheless, there is some overlap between 
certifi cation schemes and there are defi nitely 
important overlaps with other initiatives, such 
as the FFS and the IDH Tea Improvement 
Program.16 KTDA is monitoring what each 
certifi cation scheme brings in terms of 
economic and fi nancial benefi ts, and 
market penetration. How can we attribute 
observed successes to one other scheme 
or intervention when certifi cation schemes 
and interventions overlap? Providing the 
proof of principle17 is important to get 
projects and co-fi nancing going. For future 
improvement, we need to understand where 
the biggest impacts are coming from.’
Potential for Replication
As of August 2010, Kenyan smallholders 
were producing 22.4% of their total volume 
of tea in Rainforest Alliance Certifi ed farms.18 
It was an unprecedented achievement 
compared with other crops. Edward Millard, 
sustainable landscapes director at the 
Rainforest Alliance, highlighted the two 
major enablers of success for smallholder 
certifi cation in Kenya:
‘Momentum for certifi cation in tea has grown 
rapidly in Kenya owing to two major factors. 
First, a big market player, Unilever, helped 
us to send clear signs that certifi cation had 
become a market reality, and since we were 
working in a country where tea exports play 
a crucial role in its economy, the business 
case was clear from the start. Second, 
there was an unusually e  cient mechanism 
facilitating access to smallholders, KTDA. 
The economic and political strength, 
professionalism and engagement of this 
local partner were major assets.’ 
The replication dilemma was a crucial one 
for Unilever and the Rainforest Alliance. 
3.5
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Chapter 4
Building from Scratch in Argentina
 ‘Certifi cation is the 
main driver of the 
economic revival 
in the region. 
New agricultural 
practices help avoid 
deforestation of 
critically endangered 
rainforest.’
Marina Piatto,
Lead Auditor, Imafl ora
Misiones tea is considered to be of medium-
low quality but it has the unusual property 
of retaining its clarity when poured over ice. 
It has secured its place in the global tea 
market as a key component of iced tea blends. 
Unilever uses tea from Argentina mainly 
in Lipton Ice Tea sold in the US market.
In 2009, approximately 57% of the tea 
produced in Argentina went to the US and 
40% of the black tea sold in the US market 
came from Argentina.19 The fi ve major tea 
primary processing companies – Las Treinta; 
Casa Fuentes; Don Basilio; El Vasco; Koch 
Tschirsch – were responsible for more than 
half the tea produced that year. 
As of 2009, Argentina had approximately 
6,500 small tea growers, or colonos.20 Their 
family-managed farms were typically less than 
50 acres (or 25 hectares).21 Tea contributed 
to half of the family’s income. The other 
half came from herb mate production or 
complementary incomes from annual crops 
or animal production. Tea roasters in Misiones 
estimate that there are over 9,000 families 
growing tea, exporting around $100,000 
annually, making it the third most important 
income in the region, after pulp or wood 
and tobacco. 
Tea is produced in Misiones province in the north-east 
section of Argentina, close to the border with Brazil, 
in the heart of the largest remaining area of the Atlantic 
Forest in South America.
Capacity Building for Sustainable 
Tea Growing
The certifi cation roll-out with tea producers 
in Argentina started in late 2007 through one 
of the SAN partners, Imafl ora. Imafl ora had 
carried out a diagnostic of tea plantations 
in Argentina in early 2007, following its 
participation in the auditing of Unilever’s 
Kericho Tea estate in Kenya, the fi rst 
Rainforest Alliance Certifi ed tea farm.
4.1
Box 3. Imafl ora
Imafl ora (Institute for Agricultural and 
Forest Management and Certifi cation) 
is the partner organization responsible 
for the Sustainable Agriculture Network 
certifi cation in Brazil (since 1995) and 
Argentina (since 2007). It is a non-
profi t organization working to encourage 
conservation and sustainable use 
of natural resources and to promote 
social benefi ts in the forest and 
agricultural sectors. 
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As in Kenya, getting tea producers on board 
was challenging. However, scaling up went 
faster than expected once the initial resistance 
had been overcome. Piatto explained:
‘Certifi cation is a big step for producers, 
especially for farmers like those in Argentina 
who had no previous experience with 
good agricultural practices, environmental 
or social programs. They had to work 
simultaneously on many di erent issues and 
invest in farm equipment and infrastructure. 
Initially, they were suspicious and perceived 
it rather as a punishment, or as some sort of 
meaningless hard work. Few of them saw it 
as an opportunity. Thus, we decided to start 
by working with a few small groups, made 
up of the less resistant colonos. The others 
took a “wait and see” attitude. However, the 
group managers worked with the fi rst groups 
of farmers to create a visible positive 
experience and deliver quick wins that were 
easily demonstrated in the fi eld. In this way, 
after the fi rst year, suspicious farmers saw 
themselves witnessing the productivity gains 
achieved by their neighbors. They also saw 
premium prices being paid for certifi ed tea 
and became more motivated. Thus, they 
changed their view toward certifi cation. 
Once they came on board, they started 
putting a lot of e ort and energy into getting 
certifi ed. They also brought along neighbors 
and relatives.’
Rolling out tea certifi cation in Argentina 
represented a substantial challenge since 
the process had to be started from scratch. 
The key success factor in Kenya, the presence 
of a strong smallholder organization, was 
not present. In addition, the organization of 
the tea value chain was loose and there were 
signifi cant issues regarding quality and 
productivity to be addressed. 
The completely mechanized coarse plucking, 
done mainly with high-clearance tractors, 
allowed for reduced costs but had a negative 
impact on tea quality and plantation 
density.22 In addition, other issues such 
as low dissemination of relevant technical 
knowledge, information and skills on tea 
production, poor tea breeding and absence 
of integrated pest and weed management 
hindered improvement in tea quality.
Productivity and quality were also issues 
in primary processing, since only 40% 
of the 100 tea factories in Argentina used 
well-developed technology and had 
streamlined operations.23
In addition, the organization of colonos 
was very poor. Although most of them were 
associated with cooperatives, these were 
poorly organized and provided few services 
– basically negotiating prices and quantities 
with tea factories. They also did not have 
any kind of support from the government 
or research agencies and their relationship 
with tea processing factories was loose. 
There was no track record of work in health 
and safety or soil and water conservation. 
The vast majority of colonos did not receive 
any training24 and no formal mechanism 
existed for the dissemination of good 
agricultural practices. Marina Piatto, lead 
auditor at Imafl ora, remarked: 
‘The colonos did not have access to technical 
services and their approach to farming 
can best be described as “sitting down and 
watching the bushes grow; then jumping 
on the tractor and picking the leaves.” 
They had no experience in adopting good 
agricultural practices.’
Once the groups were trained and started to 
implement changes on their farms, the group 
managers monitored developments in the 
fi eld on a regular basis, provided technical 
assistance, helped with group meeting 
facilitation and made the liaison between 
certifi cation groups and tea companies. 
Equipment and infrastructure were fi nanced 
with smallholders’ own resources, or 
through cash advances given by the local 
tea factories,25 since neither governmental 
funding nor microcredit was available.
Harvesting Results
In July 2008, the fi rst group of tea growers 
in Argentina was certifi ed.26 By the end of 
the year, another six groups – representing 
90 farms, nearly 200 smallholders and 16,000 
acres of tea plantations – were certifi ed. 
By December 2010, a total of eight groups 
were certifi ed, involving 230 producers in 
480 farms.
As learned in Kenya, the feasibility of 
certifi cation roll-out depended to a large 
extent on the commitment to certifi cation 
of a strong local partner. Thus, as a fi rst step 
to certifi cation roll-out, Imafl ora brought 
the leading local tea companies on board. 
The NGO discussed with the tea companies 
the impact that Unilever’s decision to fully 
supply Lipton with tea from Rainforest 
Alliance Certifi ed farms would have on their 
business. Although they were competitors, 
Imafl ora was confi dent they would realize 
that it was in their common interest to 
join forces to make certifi cation happen. 
Piatto explained:
‘Tea companies in Misiones had no choice 
regarding the certifi cation of their supplying 
farms. Once Unilever’s decision was made, 
the only alternative to certifi cation was 
losing their main customer. It was a no-return 
road. We knew that, and we used the power 
of the market signal sent by Unilever to 
convince the local tea companies to join 
forces to fi nance and implement the training 
component of certifi cation.’
A partnership with the local tea companies 
was established, providing funds and human 
resources for training and implementation 
monitoring. Imafl ora began by training the 
group managers – agronomists, social agents 
and biologists hired by the tea companies. 
The group managers were then made 
responsible for the actual rolling-out of 
training with the colonos. They started 
by organizing the colonos into groups 
based on their location and buyer company. 
The groups carried out intense preparations, 
developing a comprehensive diagnosis, 
a streamlined work plan and fulfi lling all 
the necessary conditions to start the 
implementation of changes in their farms. 
Some of the groups took almost a year to 
get ready to implement the agricultural, 
environmental, social and heath and safety 
practices required for certifi cation.
4.2
Company (group) name Total farms
(or operations)
Conservation 
Area (ha) 
Tea Plantation 
Area (ha)
AsoLT (Grupo Las Treinta Obera) 67 162,39 837,28
Casa Fuentes (Grupo Colonos) 52 267,35 465,70
Casa Fuentes (Chacras Própias) 6 1938,00 1178,00
Don Basilio 56 470,00 1277,00
El Vasco 155 792,68 1835,45
Koch Tschirsch 59 157,61 581,23
Koch Tschirsch – San Vicente 49 230,82 520,72
Las Treinta 36 117,60 950,03
Total: 480 4,136,45 7645,41
Source: Imafl ora, 2010
Table 1. Rainforest Alliance Certifi ed groups in Argentina, December 2010
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As a result, their husbands, fathers and 
sons started to identify their potential to 
bring contributions to the family economic 
activity. We got many testimonials from 
women, expressing how grateful they 
were for being invited to participate in the 
meetings. They also told us that they felt 
more valued and included since they started 
to play an active role in their family business.’
Changes also took place in the relationships 
between local tea companies and colonos, 
and among the companies themselves. 
Because companies were o ering benefi ts 
such as medical care and technical assistance 
to fulfi ll certifi cation requirements, stronger 
bonds were created between them and the 
colonos. In addition, since the colonos 
started to build loyal relationships with their 
certifi cation groups, they became less 
tempted to sell their tea to other companies. 
The colonos also perceived concrete benefi ts 
from the improvement in their relationships 
with the local tea companies.
As the local companies continued to work 
together on other pre-competitive issues, 
a series of e ects was seen such as: increased 
collaboration in advocacy for governmental 
support in technical, scientifi c and commercial 
issues; higher e  ciency in practical matters, 
such as the processing and management 
of obligatory paperwork for agro-chemicals 
registration; reduced costs in building 
common infrastructures for treatment and 
fi nal destination of agro-chemical packaging 
waste; and the creation of local and regional 
fi re brigades.
The positive results of adopting the 
agricultural practices required for certifi cation 
were quickly seen in the fi eld as improved 
productivity and quality. Piatto exemplifi ed: 
‘One of the tea companies worked with 
farmers conducting soil analysis and 
fi nancing fertilization. Before that, tea 
growers in the region did not use fertilizers 
and had never done soil analysis. The results 
of a single annual application of fertilizers 
were astonishing. Some farmers doubled 
their productivity.’
Victor Tschirsch, manager at Koch Tschirsch,27 
wrote on the Rainforest Alliance blog:28
‘We observed that the farms under 
certifi cation increased their yields notably, 
beyond the contributions made by the 
climate. They also su ered fewer pest 
attacks and as a result the farmers had less 
work to combat pests (and lower costs, 
of course). Furthermore, the quality of the 
raw material has improved notably, which 
has led to an improvement in the quality of 
the black tea that has received the approval 
of international buyers. 
It is also undeniable that favorable 
environmental impacts have contributed 
to the economic aspects mentioned above: 
covered soils, conserved and recovered 
ecosystems, biodiversity and active fauna 
contributing to pest control, responsible 
agrochemical use, better cultural techniques, 
integrated pest management, fertilization 
programs based on soil analyses and sound 
waste management are the foundation 
of the economic benefi ts.’
Piatto described certifi cation of tea producers 
in Argentina as a driver of broad changes: 
‘It is on these farms that Imafl ora has seen 
the biggest impact of certifi cation in the 
whole of South America since we started in 
1996. Certifi cation has been the main driver 
of the economic revival that is now taking 
place in the region. And the new agricultural 
practices are defi nitely helping to avoid 
further deforestation of a critically 
endangered rainforest.’
Challenges and Potential for Replication
As of December 2010, the roll-out of 
certifi cation in Argentina had achieved 
su  cient scale to fulfi ll Unilever’s expectations 
regarding the conversion rate to Rainforest 
Alliance Certifi ed tea. However, as major tea 
brands around the world were also converting 
to certifi ed tea,29 demand was expected to 
grow fast. Future challenges for certifi cation 
roll-out in Argentina relate to expanding 
certifi cation to the colonos that supply 
smaller tea companies, which have a lower 
capacity to fi nance training and support 
implementation. 
Another challenge concerns the likely 
arrival in Argentina of other tea certifi cation 
schemes, such as Fairtrade, Organic and 
UTZ Certifi ed. It could represent a burden 
to smallholders in terms of adapting practices 
to di erent requirements and keeping up 
with cumulative documentation work.30
The roll-out of certifi cation in Argentina 
brought some interesting learning regarding 
the potential for replication in countries where 
the level of organization of smallholders is 
low. It shows that although the factors that 
enable quick upscaling are not universal, 
some good practices can be transferred, 
such as training trainers, working through 
and strengthening local organizations, 
empowering and actively including women 
and building the necessary good relationships 
with local tea companies and other key 
stakeholders, including governments.
Major changes with regard to the 
occupational health of the colonos were 
also achieved, for example, using personal 
protection elements when applying 
agrochemicals in a systematic way and 
using those agrochemicals more responsibly. 
Other benefi ts were improved access to 
potable water, the incorporation of safety 
systems during mechanical harvest, and 
increased knowledge in terms of recognizing 
and handling medical emergencies.
Changes in the social organization of colonos 
were impressive and gave rise to important 
intangible benefi ts described by Piatto:
‘The colonos appreciate participating in 
group work and having access to training 
for the fi rst time in their lives. They told me 
that before certifi cation they felt abandoned 
and that now they are feeling included and 
valued. Through certifi cation they have 
become visible to the society of the 
country they live in. They have been invited 
to talk at events; they have been interviewed 
and appeared in regional, national and 
international TV and radio programs. 
They now perceive themselves as pioneers 
and are proud of that. They have gained 
a lot of self-esteem in the process.’ 
An area where impacts of certifi cation 
were clearly seen was gender relationships. 
Colonos lived in very traditional communities 
and women were kept out of commercial 
or work-related relationships. Imafl ora used 
the certifi cation process as an opportunity 
to promote gender diversity and empower 
women to have an active role in the economic 
life of their properties (and communities). 
Piatto recalled:
‘I was probably the fi rst woman to ever 
enter a tea factory in Argentina. At the 
beginning, there were only men present 
at the meetings we organized with the 
colonos. Then we asked them to bring 
along the whole family to future meetings. 
We explained that women had a very 
important role to play in the certifi cation 
process. For example, after the training we 
gave women the responsibility to produce 
and keep the documentation required 
for certifi cation. We also put them at the 
center of the work we did on health issues. 
4.3
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Source: Unilever. Brochure “Farmer Field School project: Growing sustainable tea in Kenya.” 2009
Figure 1: FFS Contributions and Expenditures (% of total) – From 2006 to 2009
Lipton KTDADFID
Management costs 
and salaries* 27,3%
Domestic travel 3,5%
International travel 2,1%
Seedlings 1,4%
Cars and computers 1,3%
Management costs 
and salaries** 17,5%
International travel 1,4%
Native tree seedlings to
improve farm biodiversity 0,6%
Wageningen/ETC 15,1%
Management costs and 
salaries, project assistants 6,8%
Domestic travel 6,7%
Cars and computers 5,5%
Materials and 
demonstrations 3,2%
Farmers visits 2,8%
Training and meetings 1,9%
Leaf and soil analysis 1,8%
O  ce materials/telephone 1,0%
Communication materials 0,2%
DFID 45%
Lipton 35,5%
KTDA 19,5%
* including time of management and sta  
spent directly on the project
** including project manager and fi nancial 
management
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